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1 Introduction
The use of collateral by banks can be seen as serving two purposes based on the time horizon of
the collateral use. The first use of collateral is for short-term liquidity purposes, i.e. to manage
short-term liquidity shocks using contracts such as repurchase agreements. The second use is
for funding purposes, i.e. to issue long-term claims backed by collateral such as asset-backed
securities or covered bonds.1
Based mostly on the U.S. experience, the literature has generally considered that financial
intermediaries use liquid collateral such as cash or government securities for liquidity purposes
but illiquid assets such as bank loans for funding purposes (see e.g. Loutskina & Strahan, 2009;
Loutskina, 2011). In this paper we show that bank loans are commonly used by European
financial institutions as collateral both for liquidity and funding purposes. In practice, the
main use of bank loans for liquidity purposes is to serve as collateral in central bank open
market operations since bank loans are not generally accepted as collateral in private markets
for short-term funding. By pledging loans directly or by issuing ABSs backed by the loans,
banks can obtain a liquidity insurance that may be used in cases of unexpected liquidity needs.
When used for funding purposes, bank loans are pooled as collateral in ABSs or covered bonds.
By considering the use of bank loans in Europe both for liquidity and funding purposes,
this paper contributes to the literature which has mostly focused exclusively either on funding
purposes (Altomonte and Bussoli, 2014) or on liquidity purposes (Tamura and Tabakis, 2013;
Nyborg, 2016). Our comprehensive approach is also key to comparing the use of bank loans
across continents. For example, data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (SIFMA) suggest that the total value of securitised products using loans to firms
or households as collateral was $10 trillion in the United-States in 2013 versus $1.5 trillion
for Europe. While this would suggest that bank loans are rarely used as collateral in Europe,
we show that ABSs represent only part of the use of loans as collateral since covered bonds
1ABSs and covered bonds are both assets issued using loans as collateral. These loans can be used to
finance the interest payments on the asset and they may be seized in case of default by the issuer. The key
di↵erence between an ABS and a covered bond is that covered bonds o↵er a full recourse to the issuer in case
of default of the collateral. In contrast, ABSs are issued as entities separate to the issuer so that, if all loans
used as collateral were to default, the investors would not be able to seek reimbursements from the issuer. In
this paper, we show that ABSs and covered bonds can be sold to private investors for funding purposes or be
used as collateral at the central bank for liquidity purposes.
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account for a significant share of the use for funding purposes while covered bonds are rarely
used in the United-States. When liquidity purposes are also taken into account, we estimate in
section 2 that around 30% of the outstanding bank loans to firms, households and governments
are used as collateral for funding or liquidity purposes. A rough comparison with Flow of
Funds data suggests that this ratio is closer to that of the U.S. than that suggested by the
issuance of securitised products alone.
After establishing these stylised facts, section 3 provides a conceptual framework to gain
a better understanding why banks may or may not have an incentive to use their bank loans
as collateral. Using a numerical example, we show that under perfect information banks do
not have any incentive to use their loans as collateral for liquidity or funding purposes. The
argument here is similar to that of Modigliani and Miller (1958): if the bank changes the
distribution of payo↵s to its creditors, the creditors that experience an increase in the risk of
their payo↵ will react by demanding a higher premium. Overall, this will counterbalance any
potential gain from the lower funding cost required by investors with a lower risk.
There are however several reasons why bank loans may be valuable as collateral. On the
liquidity side, bank loans pledged to the central bank can be valuable for intraday payment
purposes or to insure the bank against unexpected liquidity shocks. It also provides insurance
against larger market disruptions. On the funding side, bank loans may be attractive for the
bank if their use as collateral alleviates asymmetries of information.
We then explore the micro-economic trade-o↵s faced by banks when using bank loans in
section 4. To do so, we conducted a series of interviews with four large Belgian banks. Our
analysis yields three conclusions. First, the type of borrower plays a key role in the choice
of using the loan as collateral. While the theory is relatively agnostic on whether the loan
is for instance a mortgage or a loan to a business, the data show that these characteristics
are important to determine their use. This is partly driven by regulatory requirements but
also arguably reflects di↵erent levels of information asymmetries with mortgage loans being
easier to use as collateral in ABSs or covered bonds. Our second finding is that regulatory
requirements play a central role in the use of bank loans as collateral and the influence of
regulation is both direct and indirect. Examples of direct influence include the di↵erences
in regulatory treatment of assets by the liquidity regulation and the collateral rules of the
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Eurosystem. Regulation may also have an indirect influence on the choice of banks through
e.g. a ’clientele e↵ect’ whereby investors in products backed by collateralised loans prefer
assets that are subject to lower capital requirements. Our third finding is that historical
choices play an important role in the choices made by banks and switching costs between
di↵erent types of collateral use are high. For example, some banks prefer to pledge their bank
loans to the central bank by issuing ABSs while others pledge the loans directly. When asked
whether they would consider switching to the other technology, all the banks interviewed
emphasised that the costs in terms of adapting the reporting systems to the new collateral
use would outweigh potential benefits in terms of lower haircut or everyday management costs.
In addition to providing a European perspective to the analysis of the U.S. securitisation
market of Loutskina and Strahan (2009) or Loutskina (2011), our paper also complements the
existing literature on collateral use in private repo markets where authors such as Gorton and
Metrick (2012) and Copeland et al. (2011) that document that securitised assets are often
used as collateral in private markets. In Europe, Mancini et al. (2013) focus on the private
tri-party repo market and their work suggests, as ours, that the provision of liquidity by the
central bank plays a key role in this market. But our paper also underlines the key role played
by non-marketable collateral instead of the high quality collateral used in the private market.
On the theory side, the loan-level analysis of the Belgian case provides some empirical
support to the prediction of Dang et al. (2013) that, under specific conditions, lenders do not
wish to know the exact quality of the collateral used. In line with their result, we find that
banks tend to use loans mostly along key characteristics and do not discriminate finely among
loans in a given category. Finally, our paper further illustrates the interaction of private and
public supply of liquidity of Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998).
2 Overview of the use of bank loans as collateral in Europe
This section gives an overview of how European banks use their loans as collateral. As
illustrated in Figure 1, we wish to quantify how banks allocate their loans between four
options. The first one is to keep the loans on their balance sheet (1). The second one is to use
the loans as collateral for funding purposes, i.e. to issue an ABS or a covered bond to private
3
Figure 1: Bank funding and liquidity choice for bank loans (figures are for the euro area and
in ebillion)
investors (2). Alternatively, banks may also use their loans for liquidity purposes by pledging
them directly to the central bank (3) or by pooling the loans in an asset backed security or a
covered bond and then pledging the new asset to the central bank (4). As shown in Figure 1,
we estimate using various data sources that around 30% of loans made by banks in the euro
area are used as collateral. Of these, around two thirds are used for funding purposes and the
rest is used for liquidity purposes.
As explained below, we compute these figures in three steps. First, we explore the structure
of European banks’ balance sheets. Second, we quantify the issuance of ABS and covered
bonds by European banks. Third, we use data on collateral pledged by banks to the central
bank to break down the total ABS and covered bonds into those used for funding and liquidity
purposes (since ABS or covered bonds not pledged to the central bank must be used for funding
purposes).
2.1 Bank balance sheets in the euro area
We show in Table 1 the aggregate balance sheet of banks in the euro area. Marketable assets
(such as bonds and shares) represent 18% of total assets while loans account for 53% of the
assets of banks (e17tn). Roughly a quarter of these loans are extended to firms, a third is
extended to households and a tenth to government entities, together amounting to the e10.7
billion in Figure 1. The remainder of the loans (e6.4tn) are extended to the financial sector.
On the liability side, deposits represent 53% of the total and money market instruments
account for roughly 1% of the liabilities of banks.
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Table 1: Balance sheet of Euro-area Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFI) as of January
2015
Amounts in e billion. Source: ECB Statistical Datawarehouse. Note: Non-marketable assets: Loans to euro
area residents. Marketable assets: Securities issued by euro area residents. The category “Other” includes
both marketable and non-marketable assets and mostly consists of loans to the financial sector.
Assets Liabilities
Marketable assets 5,802 18% Equity 2,421 7%
Loans / non-marketable 17,095 53% Deposits 17,073 53%
... to Gen. Govt 1,144 4% Debt 4,121 13%
... to Households 5,220 16% Other 8,676 27%
... to NFC 4,299 13% Money market 482 1%
Other 9,394 29%
Total 32,291 100% 32,291 100%
2.2 Issuance of ABS and covered bonds
We combine data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)
and the European Covered Bond Council (ECBC) to gauge the issuance of covered bonds and
ABSs by banks in the euro area. We compute for each country in the euro area the nominal
value of ABSs and covered bonds outstanding in 2014. Our results, shown in Table 2, suggest
that the total amount of ABSs and covered bonds issued in the euro area is e2,753 billion, of
which around 45% are ABSs and 55% are covered bonds.
In terms of the country distribution of securities outstanding, the euro area ABS market
is concentrated, with Spain, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium accounting for around 80%
of ABS issuance. These di↵erences across countries are partly a result of di↵erent legal and
historical environments in Europe. Countries such as Germany, Luxembourg or Austria have a
long tradition of issuing covered bonds (or ’Pfandbriefe’) for instance, whereas other countries
tend to rely more on ABSs, as is the case in the United Kingdom and the United States.
The SIFMA data also provide a breakdown of ABSs by type of loan used as collateral.
Assets secured by loans to Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs) and SMEs account for 10% of
the ABSs outstanding. ABSs backed by residential mortgages (known as RMBSs) are more
common, with a 60% share of the total ABSs issued. The remainder of the ABSs are backed
by consumer loans (e.g. car loans, credit card loans).
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Table 2: Total ABSs and covered bonds outstanding and total assets (2014, in EUR bn)
Country Covered bonds ABS CB+ABS Assets
AT 42.5 0 42.5 903
BE 8.2 114.9 123.1 1151
DE 452.2 104.9 557.1 8126
ES 364.9 245.1 610 2963
FI 29.8 0 29.8 622
FR 344.2 50.1 394.2 8540
IE 43 53.2 96.2 1109
IT 129 243.8 372.8 4076
LU 21.7 0 21.7 1017
NL 61 353.5 414.5 2518
PT 35.4 51.4 86.8 465
SK 4 0 4 64
Total 1535.9 1216.9 2752.9 32226
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), European Covered Bond Council
(ECBC) and ECB Statistical Datawarehouse.
2.3 Use of bank loans for liquidity purposes
The value after haircut of the assets pledged to the ECB in early 2015 is e1.8 trillion which
represents approximately 6% of the total balance sheet of banks (Table 1).2 Assuming an
average haircut of 10% (Dreschler et al., 2013), this suggests that around e2tn (or 6.7%) of
banks’ assets are used as collateral at the central bank. The amount e↵ectively borrowed
against this collateral was e532bn at 2015Q1.3
The assets pledged as collateral to the Eurosystem can be classified in two broad categories.
The first one includes assets such as government bonds, corporate bonds or uncovered bank
bonds that are not backed by illiquid loans extended by banks. The second category consists
of bank loan-related collateral, such as ABSs and covered bonds, which are both assets secured
by illiquid loans, as well as loans pledged directly to the central bank. In what follows we will
focus on the second category of assets.
Figure 2 shows the total amount of ABSs, covered bonds and bank loans pledged to the
ECB as well as the proportion of these assets in the ECB’s total collateral pool (right hand
scale). These assets accounted for slightly less than 60% of the total pool in 2015Q1 (value
after haircut), compared with only 35% in 2004. While there was increased use of loans at
2 The valuation haircut determines the amount that may be borrowed from the collateral. For instance, an
asset worth e100 with a haircut of 10% allows the bank to borrow up to e90.
3Source: ECB, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/charts/html/index.en.html
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the start of the financial crisis (2007/2008), it is interesting to note that the figure has not
come down since. This suggests that the use of loans reflects both a precautionary motive, as
insurance against liquidity shocks, and a regulatory motive, with a strengthening of liquidity
regulations since 2007/2008.
A first option is for banks to pledge their loans on an individual basis. As shown in Figure
2, the total amount of bank loans pledged on an individual basis at the ECB peaked at e668bn
in 2012Q3 and stood at e362bn as of 2014Q4.4 Assuming a 15% haircut (see appendix), this
suggests that the total value of loans pledged is around e425 billion (= 362/0.85), as reported
in Figure 1. Since only loans issued to non-financial corporations and public sector entities
are eligible as collateral, this implies that around 10% of loans extended to euro area firms
are pledged directly to the central bank (=e425bn /e4299bn, where e4299bn is the loans to
NFC in Table 1).
A second option is for banks to securitise their loans and pledge them as ABSs. Banks
pledged e304bn of ABS to the ECB in early 2015. This figure includes both ABSs backed by
SME loans and those backed by mortgages.
A third and last option is for banks to use their loans to government entities or to house-
holds to issue covered bonds. The amount of covered bonds pledged to the ECB is around
e320bn and similar to the levels of ABSs. Since both instruments are ’overcollateralised’ (i.e.
require more collateral than the instrument’s face value), the amount of loans to issue ABSs
and covered bonds in Figure 1 can be estimated to be at least equal to e735 billion (assuming
a haircut of 15% on these types of securities, (304 + 320)/0.85 = 735).
2.4 Use of bank loans for funding purposes
The e2,018 billion mentioned in Figure 1 is obtained by subtracting the e735 billion pledged
to the central bank from a total amount of loans used for funding purposes of e2,753 billion
in Table 2.
4The 2012Q3 figure also includes fixed term and cash deposits whereas the 2015Q1 figure only includes
bank loans. The first available breakdown is in 2013Q1 where fixed term and cash deposits accounted for 27%
of the total non-marketable assets pledged on an individual basis.
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Figure 2: Bank loans used as Eurosystem collateral, 2004Q1-2015Q1
(Source: ECB). ABSs and covered bonds refer to the use of loans as collateral to issue assets that are then
used as central bank collateral. Loans refer to the direct use of bank loans as collateral by banks (see “Non-
marketable assets” in ECB statistics). The percentage of total is the sum of the value after haircut of all 3
asset classes divided by the total value of the collateral pledged to the ECB.
2.5 International perspective
The above analysis suggests that around 30% of loans made by banks in the euro area are used
as collateral. Of these, two thirds are used for funding purposes.5 Loans for liquidity purposes
are pledged to the central bank using both securitisation (e735 billion) and direct pledges
(e425 billion). With all the caveats related to cross-continent comparisons, one potential
comparison point with the United-States could be constructed using Table L.108 from the
U.S. Flow of Funds Statistics. This Table shows that there were $20 trillion worth of loans
outstanding on the balance sheet of the domestic financial sector and $ 6.5 trillion worth of
agency and GSE backed securities in 2015Q1. This suggests that the level of loan use as
collateral in the U.S. is higher than in Europe but in similar orders of magnitude when both
funding and liquidity purposes are included in the European figures.6
5The total ABS or covered bonds is e2,753 billion of which e735 billion are pledged to the central bank so
the remaining e2,018 billion are used in the private market (Figure 1).
6While the Discount Window of the Federal Reserve also allows for the use of bank loans as collateral, the
amounts borrowed as of 2014q4 are relatively limited with a daily average around USD 40 million. Bank loans
such as consumer and commercial loans, residential and commercial real estate loans account for more than
90% of the collateral used in these transactions.
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3 Conceptual framework
In the previous section we showed that banks in Europe use a significant fraction of their
loans as collateral for liquidity and funding purposes. The facts presented raise a broader
question: Why do banks use illiquid loans as collateral?
In this section, we provide a conceptual framework to help understand why banks could
have an incentive to use bank loans as collateral. Our argument is set out in two steps: we
first show that under perfect information there should not be any incentive for a bank to use
its loans as collateral for liquidity or funding purposes. We then review several theories that
could explain why a bank may instead have an incentive to use non-marketable collateral for
liquidity or funding purposes.
3.1 Benchmark: No incentive for use of collateral under perfect informa-
tion
Consider first the benchmark case where investors have perfect information on the bank’s
prospects. We can show that in this case there is no incentive for banks to use their loans as
collateral either for liquidity purposes or for funding purposes.
Liquidity shock: With perfect information, if the bank faces a liquidity shock such as an
outflow of deposits, private lenders in the interbank market should be willing to provide the
necessary liquidity to the bank in the form of a short-term unsecured loan. The reason is that
investors know that they will be paid back and even if there is a risk of default, this risk can
be priced into the loan contract. Liquidity risk is therefore in most cases not an issue for any
solvent bank.7
Funding purposes: Similarly, with perfect information on the quality of the assets of the
bank, using loans as collateral for funding purposes would not create value for the bank. The
reason for this is very similar to the argument of Modigliani and Miller (1958): by choosing
to give some creditors privileged access to its balance sheet (the collateral), the bank changes
the payo↵ received by other creditors who will, in response, raise their required return to
7Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show the existence of “bank run” equilibria when bank depositors have
imperfect information on other participants’ liquidity shocks. Public intervention supporting solvent but illiquid
insitutions can however eliminate these equilibria.
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compensate for the greater riskiness of their claims.
Suppose for instance that a bank funds two projects which both require an initial e100
investment. The first project is risk-free and is sure to yield e120, while the second yields
e-100 with probability 1/2 and e340 with probability 1/2. The risk-free rate is 0 and the
risk premium required for pursuing both projects simultaneously is 5%.
In this case the portfolio of the bank has a positive NPV of e28.6 (with each project
having an expected payo↵ of 120 and an NPV of 14.3=120/1.05-100). The bank would thus
be able to raise up to e228.6 by issuing an equity claim against these two projects.
Since the bank owns two projects including a risk-free project and since the risk free rate
is zero, the bank could think that by issuing a risk-free asset secured by the good project it
could lower its funding cost. A debt claim that uses the good project as collateral would have
the following payo↵: in the event of failure, the debt holder would be sure to be paid back
e100 by seizing the proceeds from the first project. That claim would therefore benefit from
the risk-free required rate of return (0%). However, this securitisation would also change the
payo↵ of the remaining liabilities. In case of success, the remaining liability holders would
receive e360 (340 from the risky project plus 120 from the safe project minus a payment of
100 to the debtholders). The payo↵ in case of failure would instead be -80 (with the risky
project yielding -100 and the safe project yielding 120 minus the reimbursement of creditors
of 100). Since the total NPV of the payo↵ of the projects is still e228.6, if the bank issues
e100 of covered bond then the remaining liability holders are willing to pay e128.6. The
required return of the remaining creditors has however increased: while it was previously 5%,
it is now equal to 9% (=140/128.6-1). Figure 3 shows the required return of equity holders
for di↵erent levels of securitisation. The more securitisation increases, the higher the required
return.
3.2 Value of using non-marketable collateral for liquidity purposes
By pledging collateral to the central bank, the bank receives a credit line that may be used
to manage liquidity shortfalls. We explained above that under perfect information, liquidity
shocks are not a problem as long as the bank is solvent since the bank is always able to obtain
liquidity elsewhere. There are several reasons why this may not hold in practice, thus making
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Figure 3: Higher asset encumbrance pushes up banks’ funding costs
The figure shows a numerical simulation of the relationship between the required return on equity and the level
of issuance of secured liabilities. As the asset encumbrance of the bank increases, the funding cost of the bank
increases to compensate unsecured creditors for the lower quality of their recourse in the event of default.
credit lines valuable to banks.
A first reason is that banks use central bank money for intra-day payment (e.g. transfers
from one bank to another). Having collateral is necessary to cover potential negative account
balances during the day. A second reason is related to the over-the-counter nature of the
interbank market for short-term funds. Banks must close each business day with a positive
cash balance or face fines by the central bank. Banks that are in need of liquidity typically
contact other banks that have excess cash to obtain a loan. But this process is time-consuming
and the number of counterparties that can be contacted is limited so there is always a risk that
the bank is unable to find a counterparty before the close of business. In this case, having the
option of using a credit line from the central bank is valuable because it helps avoid potential
penalties due to negative and uncovered account balances. A simple model where banks have
a non-zero probability of not finding a counterparty and having a fine imposed on them would
therefore be su cient to explain why liquidity insurance is valuable to banks. Models along
these lines may be found in the work of Poole (1968) and Bindseil (2004).
A third reason is related to contingency planning. In addition to the search costs described
above, the money market has been shown to be sensitive to market stress. In stressed condi-
tions, banks may refuse to lend to one another and hoard liquidity (Freixas et al., 2000; Rochet
and Tirole, 1996). These situations are costly to the cash-strapped bank, which may have to
fire-sell its assets or seek emergency liquidity from the central bank to meet its obligations.
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In the worst case scenario, the bank could even default.
A credit line from the central bank can therefore be valuable to the bank because it
reduces the likelihood of financial distress in the event of a liquidity shock. Such situations
are particularly costly if the bank is forced to liquidate assets at fire-sale prices (Caballero
and Simsek, 2013) or if the bank needs to obtain costly emergency liquidity assistance from
the central bank or the government. Irani and Meisenzahl (2015) for example show that
banks with a larger wholesale exposure prior to the 2007 crisis subsequently sell more of their
syndicated loans on the secondary market.
Central bank credit lines are not without costs, however. One potential cost is a stigma
e↵ect, where banks that rely on central banks for their liquidity management may be perceived
as stressed so that other banks refuse to lend to them.8 A liquidity line from the central bank
may also be costly to the bank if it raises its level of asset encumbrance. Since the liquidity
line is secured, investors may be worried that in the event of default and if the bank borrows
its credit line the collateral will be seized so that they are left with a smaller amount of assets
to share among themselves. Finally, pledging assets to the central bank to obtain a liquidity
line may also have an opportunity cost for the bank since these may not be used for other
purposes.
3.3 Value of using non-marketable collateral for funding purposes
As for liquidity insurance purposes, we previously argued with a numerical example based on
Modigliani and Miller (1958) that there should not be any incentive for the bank to use its
non-marketable assets as collateral for funding purposes. The reasoning was that this merely
changes the distribution of payo↵ among the financiers of the bank, so the return required
by other financiers will adapt to reflect the change in payo↵. In practice, there are several
reasons why banks may nevertheless have an incentive to use non-marketable collateral for
funding purposes.
A first reason is related to the limited liability of banks and the possibility for shifting
risks outside the bank. In the example above, the net value of the bank in the downturn was
8The stigma e↵ect may be more severe if the bank becomes dependent on the credit line to meet its daily
liquidity needs.
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e-80. The net value of the bank in this state of the world is in fact equal to the value of
assets (20=120-100) minus the amount owed to the secured creditors, 100. But there there
is limited liability , the equity holders would be protected from negative losses and the value
of their shares would be either e0 or e360 so the e-80 negative net value of the firm would
be passed on to other parties (e.g. the government, other financial intermediaries). In other
words, with limited liability, extensive use of non-marketable collateral could change the final
payo↵ of the bank’s financiers and lead to risk shifting: creating risky claims whose downside
is bound by the limited liability of the bank and its shareholders.
A second and related reason could be that securitisation makes it possible to overcome a
debt overhang problem in which the bank is unable to fund new profitable investments (Myers,
1977). If the bank is undercapitalised, new investors may refuse to invest in profitable projects
since their investment would be diluted by historical claimants. By using quality loans as
collateral, the bank is able to overcome the debt overhang and can raise new funding. The
new claimants therefore have a direct claim on the quality assets and are insulated from past
unsuccessful investments by the bank.
More generally, information asymmetries between the bank and its creditors may create an
incentive for using non-marketable assets as collateral. Myers and Majluf (1984) for example
show that when existing financiers have a better knowledge of the bank’s prospects than
outsiders, the latter may require a financing premium. By using non-marketable assets as
collateral and obtaining a credit rating from an outside agency, the bank may reduce the
level of information asymmetries and the premium required by outsiders to fund the bank
(Demarzo and Du e, 1999).
The bank could also benefit from securitising its loans against potential incentive problems
where the actions of the bank’s managers are unobservable to debt holders. In such a setting,
the use of unsecured debt may create an incentive for the bank to take on excessive risk. Since
shareholders benefit mostly from the upside earnings potential, the manager could undertake
risky investments to maximise the returns to shareholders at the expense of debt holders
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Securitisation and the use of a rating from an external agency
o↵ers an opportunity to reduce this incentive for risk-taking since the loans are seized in the
event of default so that the creditor is more insulated from future decisions by the bank’s
13
managers.9
Issuing assets such as ABSs or covered bonds that are backed by non-marketable collateral
could also be profitable for banks if it allows them to cater to a specific class of investors
that would otherwise be unable or unwilling to fund its activities. For example, regulatory
restrictions limit the capacity of banks, insurance companies or pension funds to purchase
risky assets. This creates a so-called “clientele e↵ect” where demand for low risk assets with
a strong credit rating is particularly high (Berk and DeMarzo, 2007; Vayanos and Vila, 2009;
Tirole, 2010).
3.4 The role of regulatory requirements
In addition to the factors cited above, regulatory requirements could also a↵ect the use of
bank loans both for liquidity and funding purposes.
Regarding liquidity purposes, Bindseil (2013) emphasizes the interaction between the cen-
tral bank’s collateral framework and that imposed by regulatory liquidity requirements such
as the definition of “high quality liquid assets” (HQLA) in the Basel III liquidity coverage
ratio. His model explains for example why banks tend to use the least liquid assets as central
bank collateral. Koulischer and Struyven (2014) similarly show that when banks are con-
strained by collateral availability, it may be profitable for the banks to optimise the use of
collateral at the central bank or in the private market depending on the valuation haircut
imposed in the two markets.
Regarding funding purposes, there are two types of reason why regulation could influence
the decision of banks. The first are through direct e↵ects, such as by imposing banks to
retain a specific level of ABSs issued on their balance sheet (Fender and Mitchell, 2009). The
second type of e↵ect is indirect, where regulatory requirements a↵ect investors’ demand for
specific products. For example, Efing (2014) shows that regulatory considerations play a key
role in ABS investment decisions by banks domiciled in Germany. Some authors have also
argued that the capital requirements on ABSs would make them less attractive relative to
9In the case of ABS, the loans are transferred o↵ the bank’s balance sheet from the beginning of the
transaction. With covered bonds, the assets remain on the bank’s balance sheet and are used to cover the
investors’ claims in the case of failure by the bank.
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Mortgages 170 13% 29% 58%
Loans to NFC and PSE 160 1% 34% 65%
Total 330 7% 32% 61%
Source: National Bank of Belgium. Liquidity use includes retained securitisations for liquidity purposes.
other similar products like covered bonds.10
4 Loan-level determinants of the use of bank loans as collat-
eral: The case of Belgian banks
In this section, we focus on the case of Belgium. We conducted interviews with Belgian banks
and gathered additional data to explore the role of loan-level characteristics in the decision
to use bank loans for funding or liquidity purposes. We explore how banks choose to allocate
their loans between funding purposes, liquidity purposes or not using them as collateral.
In Table 3, we use data from the NBB’s Central Credit Register for lending to firms and
public-sector entities (PSEs) and aggregate data on loans to households for house purchases
(mortgages) to summarise the use of loans for funding and liquidity purposes in Belgium.11
Our estimates suggest that Belgian banks use almost 40% of their loans to households, firms
and public sector entities as collateral. The use of loans for liquidity purposes accounts for
four-fifths of the collateral used. In other words, for every e3 of loans issued by Belgian banks
to households or firms, e1 is used as central bank collateral (and pledged either directly or
through securitisations). There is also variation across loan types, since loans to firms or the
public sector are rarely used for funding purposes. Mortgages, on the other hand are more
amenable for use as collateral in the private market.
Belgian banks tend to use bank loans as collateral more intensively than the euro area
average, with a 40% usage rate versus 25% for euro area banks. They also tend to use their
loans more for liquidity purposes relative to their euro area peers. While euro area banks use
10See e.g. “EBA report on qualifying securitisation”, European Banking Authority, June 26, 2015.
11Loans to Non-Financial Corporations (NFC) are typically composed of loans to small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs) and loans to corporates.
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around 15% of their loans for funding purposes, we find that Belgian banks only use 7% of
their loans for funding purposes.
To further explore the determinants of loan usage, we conducted interviews at the four
largest Belgian banks: Belfius, BNP Paribas Fortis (BNPPF), ING Belgium (ING BE) and
KBC. These banks collectively account for more than 80% of loans made in Belgium.
We find that there are three main determinants. First, the type of borrower (public sector,
household or firm) plays a key role in the use of the loan. Covered bonds issued in the private
market are almost exclusively backed by mortgage loans. Mortgages are also used to issue
ABSs as central bank collateral. Loans to public sector entities are more likely to be pledged
directly while loans to non-financial corporations are either pooled in an ABS that is pledged
to the central bank or pledged on an individual basis. Second, regulatory requirements play
a central role in banks’ choices. The role played by regulatory requirements is both direct,
through arbitrage between for instance liquidity regulation and the collateral framework of
the central bank, and indirect by influencing the demand of investors. Third, we find that
historical choices and switching costs are an important factor in the use of loans as collateral
by banks. In the following subsections, we explore each finding separately.
4.1 Loan Type
An important criterion for determining the use of bank loans as collateral is the loan type.
The three main types of loans that we consider are loans to households (and mortgages in
particular), loans to public sector entities (PSE) and loans to Non-Financial Corporations
(corporates and SMEs). Figure 4 summarises a ’typical’ decision tree for using banks loans in
Belgium. Mortgages are the most frequent type of loan used as collateral for funding purposes.
But they are also used by banks for liquidity purposes.12 Banks often issue ABSs backed by
mortgages that are then used as collateral at the central bank. Public sector loans are mostly
used for liquidity purposes. If they are eligible as collateral on an individual basis (and satisfy
the minimum size criteria), banks pledge them to the central bank directly. Finally, the use of
loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs) varied across banks, with some using these loans
exclusively through ABSs, others only pledging them directly to the central bank or using
12PSE loans were used in only 2 covered bonds as of early 2015.
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Figure 4: Typical decision rule of Belgian banks for using loans for funding and liquidity
purposes
both ABSs and direct pledges. However, the NFC loans used for ABSs are mostly composed
of loans that would not be eligible on an individual basis.
Mortgage loans. Most banks issue mortgage-backed covered bonds on the private market.
A law allowing banks to issue covered bonds was introduced in 2012 in Belgium. The country
has since experienced strong issuance, with high demand for covered bonds from institutional
investors. Belgian banks have issued around e5bn of covered bonds per year since 2012
(Figure 5 in appendix). As 2015Q1, Belgian banks had issued 84 covered bonds for a total
value of e15.9 billion.13 The covered bonds issued by Belgian banks cover a wide range of
maturities (Figure 6 in appendix), from 2 years to 25 years and a weighted average maturity
of 7.5 years.
Belgian covered bonds have also benefited from strong demand and attractive yields for
issuing banks. This is illustrated in Figure 7 in appendix, which shows that yields on short-
dated covered bonds entered negative territory in April 2015.
According to the bank experts interviewed, there are at least five factors behind the
strong demand for covered bonds. First, they benefit from more favorable treatment by the
capital and liquidity rules than traditional securitisations. Second, covered bonds o↵er a “dual
recourse” so that if the loans themselves were to be become non-performing, the bank would




still be liable to investors. Third, covered bonds benefit from a good reputation and are viewed
as “almost risk-free” securities. This contrasts with asset-backed securities in particular as
they were badly a↵ected during the 2009-2011 financial crisis. Fourth, covered bonds benefit
from a standardised legal setting so they are less information-sensitive. Finally, the ECB’s
covered bonds purchase programme has also contributed to higher demand for these assets.
But covered bonds are not the only use of mortgage loans made by Belgian banks. Most
banks also issue RMBSs (ABSs backed by mortgages) that are then pledged to the central
bank. Since mortgages may not be pledged to the NBB on an individual basis, securitisation
represents the only option to use these loans for liquidity insurance purposes. The RMBSs
issued are rated by credit rating agencies and have to meet several criteria for example re-
garding the concentration of borrowers inside the pool, the diversity of borrowers in terms of
sectors and riskiness of the claims used as collateral.
PSE loans. These loans are specific in the sense that for most banks they are not the core
business and they do not lend themselves easily to securitisation, as an ABS built from PSE
loans would su↵er from a lack of diversification. As a result, the only options for banks are
to use their claims on PSEs in a covered bond or to pledge them directly to the central bank.
All banks interviewed in fact use this latter strategy. The main reason for doing so is that the
reporting requirements are smaller for public sector loans, which can benefit from the credit
rating of the federal government. To pledge loans to private sector firms, banks would instead
have to provide their internal rating and obtain the approval of their credit rating model from
the Eurosystem.
Loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs). Belgian regulations prevent banks from using
NFC loans in covered bonds, as is the case in other countries. Since there is also little appetite
in the private market for ABSs backed by NFC loans (especially in contrast with the market
for covered bonds backed by mortgages), NFC loans can only be used for liquidity insurance
as central bank collateral. The trade-o↵ faced by banks which want to mobilise these loans
for liquidity reasons is to put them in an ABS (pledged to the central bank) or to pledge them
on an individual basis to the NBB.
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4.2 Regulation
A second finding to emerge from the interviews, which is confirmed by data analysis, is that
regulatory requirements play a key role in the choices made by banks.
A large part of the regulatory environment faced by Belgian banks is common to all banks
in the euro area. Banks are subject to a liquidity regulation that requires them to hold a
minimum stock of “high-quality liquid assets” to be used as collateral in case of turmoil.
The rules regarding the use of bank loans as collateral are described in the “Re`glement des
cre´dits intrajournaliers et des ope´rations de politique mone´taire de la Banque nationale de
Belgique”.14 The main framework for the NBB’s operations is in line with the rules of the
Eurosystem: when pledging bank loans directly, the loan must have a probability of default
(PD) lower than 0.4% (equivalent to a BBB- rating) and the borrower must be a non-financial
corporation or a public sector entity.15 ABSs must have a rating above BBB- and only the
most senior tranche can be used as collateral. In addition, the National Bank of Belgium
requires loans to be at least e100,000. We describe these rules in more detail in appendix 5.
There are many ways in which regulatory requirements could a↵ect the use of loans by
banks, and arguably the most direct one is by giving the bank the choice between options.
The case of Belgium is interesting in this respect because it did not allow the issuance of
covered bonds until 2012 as mentioned above. This feature illustrates the role of institutional
factors in explaining the cross-country di↵erences in the uses of covered bonds or ABSs that
we documented in section 2.
In general, regulatory requirements can have direct and indirect e↵ects on the choices
made by banks. Direct e↵ects occur when banks actively respond to regulatory requirements.
Indirect e↵ects occur when banks respond to demand from investors who are themselves
influenced by regulatory requirements.
One example of a direct e↵ect is the fact that most of the loans used as collateral in
the ABSs pledged to the central bank would have been ineligible on an individual basis. To
reach this conclusion (which was also confirmed in the interviews), we studied the issuance
14https://www.nbb.be/doc/ts/enterprise/activities/monetarypolicy/reglementbx2009fr.pdf
15The Probabilities of Default are taken from the banks’ internal rating models after approval of the models
by the central bank.
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Table 4: ABSs issued by Belgian banks and backed by loans to non-financial corporations
Bank Belfius BNPPF ING BE Average
ABS Name Mercurius Esmee Master Lion SME II
Class A (senior) princi-
pal amount (emn)
3200 4205 4776 4060
Junior principal amount
(emn)
924 2062 1812 1599
Number of Firms 38700 36864 34454 36673
Number of Claims 60500 79054 72447 70667
Mean loan size (ke) 68 79 91 79
Weighted average matu-
rity (years)
9.6 10.3 7.2 9
% of claims (exposure-
weighted) with bor-
rower’s PD> 0.4%
81.6% 78.6% 53.6% 71.3%
Source: ABS issuance prospectus.
prospectus of three ABSs backed by SME collateral and eligible as central bank collateral.
The aggregate descriptive statistics in Table 4 suggest that a large share of the loans in the
ABSs would not be eligible for use on an individual basis as they do not meet the two eligibility
criteria of size and minimum default probability threshold.
In fact, a key takeaway from Table 4 is that the ABSs are primarily used to package small
loans. The average size is e79,000, which is below the minimum size required to use a loan
as central bank collateral. Assuming a symmetric size distribution, this suggests that more
than half of the loans used in ABSs are ineligible.
Another criterion for eligibility is the default probability of the claim. An analysis of the
ratings distribution of the claims securing the ABSs confirms that a significant share of the
loans is not eligible on an individual basis. For example, about 50% of the claims in the ABS
issued by ING Belgium have a default probability higher than 0.4%, which is the eligibility
threshold. For the ABSs issued by BNP Paribas Fortis and Belfius, these percentages amount
respectively to 79% and 82%.
These two analyses use aggregate information on the size of the loan or the credit rating
of the borrower to determine eligibility. Since the eligibility is based on both the size and
the rating, these estimates can therefore be interpreted as lower bounds for the proportion
of the claims in the ABS that are ineligible. To have an additional sense of the eligibility of
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the underlying claims, we also downloaded loan-level information on the content of one ABS
deal from the European Datawarehouse. The analysis confirmed that ABSs are mostly used
to package ineligible bank loans into eligible securities.
The prevalence of ineligible loans in securitised transactions is arguably unsurprising given
that the e↵ective haircut applied to ABSs is relatively high. As shown in Table 4, an average
ABS is composed of loans worth e5.6 billion in total. The junior notes, which serve as a
bu↵er in the event of defaults in the loan portfolios, account for 28% of the loans pledged
and cannot be used as collateral. In other words, if a bank pools loans worth e100 into an
ABS, e28 of these loans must be kept as “junior tranches” and only e72 may be issued as
“Class A” notes, which are eligible to the central bank. Since the haircut on an ABS is set
at 10%, this implies that from its initial e100, the bank will only be able to borrow e64.8
(=72*0.9), or an e↵ective haircut of 39.5%. This figure should be put in perspective with the
haircut on bank loans pledged on an individual basis, which range from 10% to 44% (Table 5
in appendix). While the e↵ective haircut on an ABS is on the high end of this range, it must
also be kept in mind that most loans would be ineligible for direct use (which is equivalent to
a 100% haircut). ABSs thus provide an opportunity to reduce the e↵ective haircut on loans
that could not otherwise be used, but at the cost of a haircut that remains relatively high.
These computations do not take into account additional costs of issuing ABSs, such as
the need to obtain a rating and other issuance costs. Interviews with bank experts confirmed
that these costs are significant. On top of the credit rating and legal fees required for the
issuance, the use of ABSs also generates regular reporting costs to rating agencies as well as
the European Datawarehouse.
While the choice of the optimal use of collateral for liquidity purposes is an example of
the direct e↵ects of regulation, the interviews also suggested that regulation a↵ects the use of
collateral for funding purposes in an indirect way, by influencing the demand of investors.
For example, banks mentioned that none of their loans are currently being used as col-
lateral in any ABS sold to the market, owing to the lack of demand. One of the reasons
cited was that the capital and liquidity treatment of ABSs was perceived as being too harsh
by investors (mainly other banks, insurance companies or pension funds) relative to covered
bonds. The di↵erences in capital rules across the two assets are also associated with the dif-
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ferent reputations that these instruments have, with ABSs still under the impact of a negative
stigma e↵ect from the crisis.
4.3 Switching Costs and Historical Decisions
A third insight gained from the talks with banks is that historical decisions on pledging
loans directly to the central bank or via an ABS, or past issuances of covered bonds play an
important role in the choice of collateral use by banks. This suggests that there are important
switching costs between the various options. For example, if a bank issues an ABS in order
to use it as central bank collateral, it is unlikely to respond rapidly, for example, to changes
in the haircut on credit claims or in eligibility criteria.
The two strategies (ABS versus pledging claims individually) in fact have di↵erent re-
quirements in terms of reporting. ABSs must be rated by an external credit rating agency,
and the pool of loans is also monitored regularly. The ECB also requires banks to submit
information on the collateral used in the ABS to the European Datawarehouse. Using credit
claims as collateral also imposes practical constraints on banks. They must report on a daily
basis any changes to the loans used as collateral. When internal ratings are used, the models
have to be approved by the Eurosystem. Banks must also pay a small fee for each loan used
as collateral.
High switching costs and historical decisions are therefore also important in understanding
why for instance some banks rely more on ABSs while others directly pledge individual credit
claims instead.
5 Conclusion: Open questions and policy implications
We have explored the use of bank loans as collateral in Europe. While the use of collateral
such as government debt or high-grade corporate bonds is well documented, there is much less
evidence on the use of illiquid assets such as bank loans used as collateral. We find that banks
make wide use of their loans as collateral, up to 30% in the case of the euro area. The use of
this collateral serves two broad purposes. The first is for short-term liquidity purposes, i.e.
to manage short-term liquidity shocks using contracts such as repurchase agreements. The
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second use is for funding purposes, i.e. the issuance of long-term claims backed by collateral
such as asset-backed securities. We then explore the micro determinants of the choice of
using bank loans for funding or liquidity purposes focusing on the case of Belgian banks.
We find that loan types are key to alleviating asymmetries of information; that regulatory
requirements play a major role in the choices of banks, both directly and indirectly through
clientele e↵ects; and we find that there are significant switching costs between the various
uses of bank loans as collateral so historical decisions also determine the use of bank loans as
collateral.
These insighs are interesting because, arguably, they are not the core issues that the the-
oretical literature has focused on. While the literature tends to ignore frictions or transaction
costs to focus on optimisation by agents, we find that “mechanical” constraints such as his-
torical decisions and high switching costs are often first order. Similarly, we do not find any
evidence of micro-level arbitrage between loan types when choosing what type of loan to use
at the central bank, in contrast to the predictions of a typical adverse selection model.
More generally, the paper provides insight into the trade-o↵ faced in the design of central
bank collateral policy regarding bank loans. On the one hand, the regular use of bank loans as
collateral can help generate information on loan quality and support the appropriate internal
processes so that, in the event of a liquidity shock, the central bank can rapidly provide
liquidity while ensuring that the collateral is sound. If the central bank has better information
on loan prospects, for instance through regulatory activities, accepting bank loans can also
mean e cient use of collateral and provide liquidity to the most illiquid assets, bank loans.
On the other hand, our finding that regulation creates a pecking order suggests that the
central bank could end up receiving the less liquid collateral. It could also lead to insu cient
collateral holdings by banks if they know that they will benefit from liquidity support in a
shock scenario. An integrated approach to these issues would be extremely useful and our
paper represents a first step in this direction.
Finally, this paper underscores the need to take both funding and liquidity motives into
consideration when looking at issues such as securitisation or the use of credit claims as central
bank collateral. Since bank loans are used for di↵erent purposes, changing conditions for one
purpose may lead to a substitution by banks. Our results also highlight the importance of the
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loan types in the use of bank collateral so that policies that a↵ect one type of product may not
uniformly a↵ect all types of loans. For instance, since covered bonds are mostly composed of
mortgages, introducing a more favourable legal environment for these assets may encourage
the issuance of mortgages but not loans to firms.
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Central Bank Collateral Rules
Since bank loans are not allowed as collateral in most private market short-term lending
platforms, the Eurosystem is the main provider of liquidity accepting the use of bank loans
as collateral.
In practice, there are two ways of using bank loans as central bank collateral. The first
one is to pledge the bank loans on an individual basis. In this case, only specific types of loans
are eligible as collateral and the criteria used are (a) the borrower must be a non-financial
corporation or a public sector entity. Loans to households and mortgages are thus not eligible
on an individual basis. (b) The loan must have a probability of default (PD) lower than 0.4%
(equivalent to a BBB- rating). The probability of default is computed from the internal model
of the bank (approved by the regulator and reviewed by the market operations team) or by the
in-house credit assessment of the central bank. For loans to public sector entities, banks have
the additional option to apply the credit rating of the sovereign (mapped into a probability
of default).16 (c) Finally, there is a minimum size limit set at e500,000 for the Eurosystem,
but where national central banks have the option to set a lower threshold (in Belgium, the
threshold is e100,000). Once a loan is eligible, the size of the credit line depends on a haircut
that varies with loan characteristics, most notably its PD and its residual maturity (see Table
5).
The second option is to pool the loans as collateral to issue a security backed by the
loans (an asset-backed security or a covered bond). In the case of asset backed securities,
the Eurosystem only accepts the senior tranche as collateral which must have a minimum
rating of A- (the rating is determined by an external credit rating agency). The ABSs are
also subject to regular reporting requirements on the pool of loans backing the asset. Covered
bonds must have a minimum credit rating of BBB-.
16Public sector entities which are classified as being of “type 1” receive the rating of the sovereign whereas
PSEs of “type 2” receive the rating of the sovereign minus 3 notches.
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Table 5: ECB haircut schedule for non-marketable assets
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Figure 5: Issuance of covered bonds in Belgium
Issuance of covered bonds in Belgium
Belgian banks had issued e13.9bn worth of covered bonds in 2015Q1 and we estimate that
this figure was e19.3bn by May 2015. Assuming an overcollateralisation ratio of 35%, this
implies that the pool of loans used as collateral for these covered bonds amounted to e25.6
billion (= 19.3/(1   .35)). Since these covered bonds were issued in the private market, the
use of loans for funding purposes is e25.6 billion.
On the securitisation side, Belgian banks had issued e114.9 billion worth of ABS as of 2014
(source: SIFMA). ABSs backed by mortgage loans account for around three quarters of this
amount while ABSs backed by loans to SMEs account for the remaining quarter. Securitised
assets in Belgium are mostly retained on balance sheet and are not sold to the private market
and these transactions have a liquidity purpose, i.e. their main goal is to create collateral
that is eligible at the central bank. Belgian banks also use a significant share of their loans
directly as central bank collateral.
The law allowing Belgian banks to issue covered bonds was introduced in 2012. By 2015,
Belgian banks had issued 84 covered bonds for a total value of e15.9bn (data on covered
bond issuance is publicly available on the NBB’s website). Figure 5 shows the total amount
of Belgian covered bonds outstanding since the law was introduced. Banks have regularly
issued new securities and the total amount of covered bonds outstanding stood at e15.9bn in
mid-2015.
As shown in Figure 6, the covered bonds have a wide range of maturities, from the 2-3
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Figure 6: Distribution of maturities of Belgian covered bonds (2015Q2)
Figure 7: Yield on Belgian covered bonds by maturity group (Source: Bloomberg and authors’
calculations)
year range to above 20 years.
The covered bonds issued by Belgian banks have also benefited from a favorable pricing
from the market. In Figure 7, we downloaded data for 80 covered bonds from Bloomberg
and took the average yield per maturity category. The figure shows that the interest rate
commanded on covered bonds was relatively low, hitting zero for bonds with shorter maturities
in April 2015. The yield on Belgian government debt with 10-year maturity was for instance
1.12 at the end of the sample period.
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